In this paper the author implies that there is no hard evidence demonstrating consistent violations of the International Code by the baby food industry, despite the regular monitoring reports published by the International Code Documentation Centre (ICDC) (http://ibfan.org/ icdc/). And it must be pointed out that there is more than 'an assumption' that the baby food industry plays a part in decreasing breastfeeding rates. Studies have found that when frequency of adverts for artificial feeding increased, percentage change in breastfeeding rates decreased, 1 while a 2006 review by the US Congressional Accountability Office found a majority of studies that examine giving free formula samples to mothers at hospital discharge found lower breastfeeding rates among mothers receiving samples. 2 No one denies that the Code includes recommendations for stakeholders other than the baby food industry. There is also no argument that some of these stakeholders have failed as duty bearers to protect the best interest of the child. But when it comes to unethical marketing and the ensuing harm to infant and young child health, the fault must lie solely with industry. What the author describes as a 'systematic deficiency' in a 'multi-stakeholder', 'multi-layered process' is no excuse for the baby food industry to not comply with the minimum standard set by the International Code. Forward looking companies recognise that compliance is the price of doing business and are developing governance, risks and compliance initiatives to ensure greater corporate accountability. The baby food industry should not be looking for excuses or soft alternatives where Code commitments are concerned.
FTSE4Good is one glaring example of a soft alternative. While the author points to it as an interesting initiative addressing governance of infant formula manufacturers through its breastmilk substitute criteria, many critics point out that the FTSE4Good criteria were actually weakened to allow a well-known Code violating company like Nestlé to gain access to this ethical investment index, while still engaging in marketing practices prohibited by the Code. Just like Nestlé (and lately Danone), the FTSE criteria now introduce a false distinction between high-risk countries (those with at least 10 per 1000 under five mortality rate) where they require an 'acknowledgement that the adoption and adherence to the Code is a minimum requirement' and the rest of the world where they don't. The author endorses the Nestlé/Danone /FTSE approach on the assumption that global infant feeding policy is oriented towards the poorest of nations and finds it illogical that all nations should commit to the same recommendations. This is contrary to the World Health Assembly's position that the International Code is global and applies in all countries, since parents and infants in industrialised countries deserve the same level of protection from inappropriate and unethical marketing as those in developing nations. Interestingly, the author ignores the 2012 UNICEF-commissioned report 3 from his own country which shows that low breastfeeding rates in the UK lead to an increased incidence of illness with significant cost to the health service. Even a moderate increase in breastfeeding rates could save £40 million in the UK health budget. If that is not considered significant for a policy review on Code implementation, one can only speculate as to what interests are at play. See also Pediatircs 4 which reported that if 90% of US families comply with recommendations to breastfeed exclusively for 6 months, the US would save $13 billion and prevent more than 911 deaths per year.
Another worrying point the author makes is that the 6 months exclusive breastfeeding target is being challenged. The author dislikes WHO's 'one-size-fits-all' policy and backs his challenge up by referring to studies by the Yeong Joo Kean, Legal Advisor # The Author 2013, Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Faculty of Public Health. All rights reserved ESPGHAN Committee on Nutrition which, unfortunately, is notorious for being a mouthpiece of the industry. He omits to mention that following the publication of the ESPGHAN studies, WHO issued a statement 5 (based on the systematic review of evidence from trials and studies conducted in both developed and developing countries) reiterating its recommendation for mothers worldwide to exclusively breastfeed infants for the child's first 6 months. The recommendation also states that after 6 months, infants and young children should be given nutritious complementary foods and continue breastfeeding up to the age of 2 years or beyond. The baby food industry often chooses to ignore continued breastfeeding altogether.
The paper also underestimates the success of Code implementation around the world. According to the Euromonitor International Report Global Packaged Food: Market Opportunities for Baby Food to 2013, government regulation is a 'growing constraint', and the industry is 'fighting a rearguard action against regulation on a country-by-country basis'. The report notes that 'There are significant international variations in the regulations governing the marketing of milk formula, which are reflected in sales differences across countries'.
The report has a chart showing the huge disparity in the retail value of milk formula sales between China and India, which according to Euromonitor, is mainly due to the significant differences between their official regulatory regimes.
There have been other achievements at a country level when a Code-based law is implemented. Labels change. Promotional practices are curtailed and hospital practices are modified to suit national laws. Legal compliance should be de rigueur everywhere. The baby food industry should support universal Code implementation because it levels the playing field. Unfortunately, ICDC has documented multiple attempts by the baby food industry to weaken the Code implementation process everywhere, even in developing countries with high malnutrition and mortality indicators. In 2012, three new countries: Vietnam, Kenya and South Africa adopted Code legislation in spite of industry objections, bringing the number of countries with legislation covering all or most of the provisions of the Code to 69. There would be more if it had not been for active undermining by the baby food industry and their trade associations.
In order to support his call for participation and cooperation in infant nutrition worldwide, the author fails to recognise that unlike other businesses, there can be no convergence of will between those promoting breastfeeding and those pushing baby feeding products. The author makes no mention of the need to set up mechanisms to avoid conflicts of interest in nutrition actions as recommended by World Health Assembly Resolution 65.6 [2012] . That is a serious omission.
The author proposes an 'independent' international governance board (IGB) to advise governments and organisation on the establishment of governance structures and systems that will underpin the Code. ICDC is not aware of any parallel system that the IGB could be modelled on so it will be looking for concrete suggestions from the author that is not just ideological but logical. By 'independent', it is hoped that the author means the IGB would be free of commercial influence.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the 'International Code Secretariat' alluded to by the author in page 3 of his paper does not exist.
